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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a new optimum output quantity decision analysis of a duopoly market under a fuzzy
decision environment. To efficiently handle the fuzziness of the decision variables, the linguistic values, subjectively represented by
the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, are used to act as the evaluation tool of decision variables such as fixed cost and unit variable cost.
This paper will apply fuzzy set theory to construct an optimum output quantity decision model based on aiming for the maximum
profit of a duopoly market. By using this decision model, the decision-makers’ fuzzy assessments with various variables can be
considered in the decision process to assure more convincing and accurate decision-making.
c© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
To maximize profit and minimize overall cost, the optimum output quantity decision has been an important issue
for industrial organization. In a duopoly market, two models can be used to optimize the output quantity. One of them
is the Cournot model [1–3], and the other is the Stackelberg model [4]. The Cournot and Stackelberg models are
similar because, in both, competition occurs in terms of quantity. The Cournot model forms a situation in which each
firm chooses its output independently. The Stackelberg model is a two-stage leadership in which the leader chooses its
output quantity before the follower does. The follower then notes the leader’s choice of output quantity and chooses its
own output quantity [5]. Both Cournot and Stackelberg model play a vital role in such fields as economics, behavioral
sciences, management, and politics [6–8].
Alepuz and Urbano [9] analyzed how learning behavior can change the outcome of competition in a duopoly
industry facing demand uncertainty. They found that each firm will increase its first period quantity for the myopic
choice to make price a more informative signal. Wang [10] studied and compared fee and royalty licensing in a
differentiated Cournot duopoly. The study results showed licensing by a royalty may be better than a fixed-fee from the
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viewpoint of the patent-holding firm. However, the consumer preferred the fixed-fee licensing. Barr and Saraceno [11]
examined the effects of both environmental and organizational factors on the outcome of repeated Cournot games.
Eiselt [12] examined a facility planner’s advantage resulting from knowledge of his competitor’s opinion in the
location Stackelberg games. Some valuable findings are obtained. For example, given perfect information, the leader
always has an advantage over the follower. Lavigne et al. [13] presented a general method to study the electricity
market of a country or region, under various pricing mechanisms. The study results showed monopolistic pricing
chosen by the producer to minimize its costs while knowing the optimal consumers’ reaction to the proposed price of
electricity leads to a Stackelberg-type equilibrium. Nie [6] explored discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games with an
open loop complete state. The study pointed out that both feedback and closed loop dynamic Stackelberg games with
complete information are valuable in explaining some social and economic phenomena. Yang and Zhou [8] analyzed
the effects of the duopolistic retailers’ different competitive behaviors - Cournot Collusion and Stackelberg - on the
optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the duopolistic retailers themselves. The results showed that the total profit
of the duopolistic retailers who act as the followers will exceed the more powerful manufacturer’s profit as long as the
dissimilarity between the duopolistic retailers’ market demands is sufficient.
In a duopoly market, four patterns to market structure can be formed. They are: (1) both companies A and B are
followers; (2) company A is a leader and company B is a follower; (3) company B is a leader and company A is a
follower; (4) both companies A and B are leaders. In pattern (2) and (3), the leader makes the optimum output quantity
decision by considering the response function of the follower, then, the follower decides his optimum output quantity
based on the leader’s decision. In pattern (1), the optimum output quantities of companies A and B can be solved
by the simultaneous-equation models constructed by their response function respectively. In pattern (4), the optimum
output quantities of companies A and B can be achieved when they are recognized as leaders.
In conventional precision-based models of duopoly, decision variables are expressed in crisp values [14,15].
However, because of the insufficiency and uncertainty of information in the decision environment, it is difficult to find
the exact economic assessment data, such as the prices of products, volume of activity, per unit variable costs, and total
fixed costs. Therefore, the precision-based decision may be ineffective. In fact, when decision-makers decide, they
assess based on their professional knowledge, experience, and subjective judgment. Linguistic values, such as “about
2000 dollars”, “about 40%”, are usually used to suggest their estimations. Fuzzy set theory can play a significant role
in this decision-making environment.
Fuzzy set theory was introduced by Zadeh [16] to solve problems in which a source of vagueness existed. Linguistic
values can be expressed fittingly by the approximate reasoning of fuzzy set theory [17]. To deal with the ambiguities
involved in the process of linguistic estimations effectively, the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are used to characterize
fuzzy measure of linguistic values [18]. At the same time, combining the Cournot and Stackelberg models, a fuzzy
duopoly model which considers the factors of market demand, business cost and market position is developed to
answer the optimum output quantity of duopoly market under a fuzzy decision environment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces fuzzy set theory. The fuzzy model of duopoly is developed
in Section 3. A numerical example to explain the computational process of a fuzzy model of duopoly will be presented
in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5.
2. Fuzzy set theory
In this section, some concepts of fuzzy set theory used in this paper are briefly introduced.
2.1. Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers
A fuzzy number A [19] is described as a special fuzzy subset of real numbers whose membership function fA
satisfies five conditions. (1) fA is a continuous mapping from R (real line) to a closed interval [0, 1], (2) fA (x) = 0,
for all x ∈ (−∞, c]∪[d,∞), (3) fA (x) is strictly increasing in the interval [c, a], (4) fA (x) = 1, for all x ∈ [a, b], (5)
fA (x) is strictly decreasing in the interval [b, d]. Where c, a, b, d are real numbers, and−∞ < c ≤ a ≤ b ≤ d <∞.
For convenience, f LA is named as the left membership function of fuzzy number A, defining f
L
A (x) = fA (x), for
all x ∈ [c, a]; and f RA is named as the right membership function of fuzzy number A, defining f RA (x) = fA (x), for
x ∈ [b, d]. The fuzzy number A in R is a trapezoidal fuzzy number if its membership function fA : R→ [0, 1] is
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fA (x) =

(x − c) / (a − c) , c ≤ x ≤ a
1, a ≤ x ≤ b
(x − d) / (b − d) , b ≤ x ≤ d
0, otherwise
(1)
where −∞ < c ≤ a ≤ b ≤ d <∞.
The trapezoidal fuzzy number, as given by Eq. (1), can be represented by (c, a, b, d). The interval [a, b] of
trapezoidal fuzzy number A gives the maximal grade of fA(x), that is, fA (x) = 1, x ∈ [a, b]; it is the most probable
value of the evaluation data. In addition, c and d are the lower and upper bounds of the available area of the evaluation
data. They are used to reflect the fuzziness of the evaluation data. The narrower the interval [c, d] is, the lower the
fuzziness of the evaluation data.
The trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are easily used and interpreted. For example, ‘approximately between 800 and 810’
can be represented by (795, 800, 810, 815); and the more blurry representation can be represented as (790, 800, 810,
820). In addition, an exact number, ‘a’ can be represented by (a, a, a, a). For example, ‘40’ can be represented by
(40, 40, 40, 40).
By the extension principle [16], the extended algebraic operations of two trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, A1 =
(c1, a1, b1, d1) and A2 = (c2, a2, b2, d2), can be expressed as:
A1 ⊕ A2 = (c1 + c2, a1 + a2, b1 + b2, d1 + d2) , k ⊗ A = (kc, ka, kb, kd) , k ∈ R, k ≥ 0.
2.2. The ranking of fuzzy numbers
In the fuzzy model of duopoly, ranking the fuzzy profits and fuzzy total profits being considered is important
and essential. Many methods of ranking fuzzy numbers have been proposed [20–27]. The graded mean integration
representation method [28] not only improves on some drawbacks of existing ranking methods, but also has the
advantage of easy implementation and power in problem solving. So, it will be used to characterize the presentation
value of the trapezoidal fuzzy number and rank the fuzzy profits and fuzzy total profits.
Let Ai = (ci , ai , bi , di ), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, be n trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. The graded mean integration
representation P (Ai ) of Ai is
P (Ai ) = ci + 2ai + 2bi + di6 . (2)
Let P (Ai ) and P
(
A j
)
be the graded mean integration representations of Ai and A j , respectively. Define that
Ai > A j if and only if P (Ai ) > P
(
A j
)
,
Ai < A j if and only if P (Ai ) < P
(
A j
)
,
Ai = A j if and only if P (Ai ) = P
(
A j
)
.
3. Fuzzy model of duopoly
Notation
qi : The output quantity of company i .
Q: The total output quantity of duopoly market.
P(Q): The demand price under Q.
FTCi : The fuzzy cost function of company i .
fi : The fuzzy fixed cost of company i .
ci : The fuzzy unit variable cost of company i .
FTpii : The fuzzy profit function of company i .
qFik : The optimum output quantity of company (follower) i in pattern k.
qL ik : The optimum output quantity of company (leader) i in pattern k.
Pk : The market equilibrium price in pattern k.
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FTpiFik : The fuzzy maximum profit of company (follower) i in pattern k.
FTpiL ik : The fuzzy maximum profit of company (leader) i in pattern k.
Let qA and qB represent the output quantities of companies A and B, respectively. Let Q be the total output quantity
of duopoly market. That is, Q = qA + qB . Suppose the demand price P(Q) is
P(Q) = α + βQ = α + β (qA + qB) . (3)
In addition, we define the fuzzy cost functions of companies A and B, represented by FTCA and FTCB , as follows.
FTCA = fA ⊕ cA ⊗ qA (4)
FTCB = fB ⊕ cB ⊗ qB (5)
where, fA and fB stand for the fuzzy fixed costs, cA and cB represent the fuzzy unit variable costs, and
fA = ( f 1A, f 2A, f 3A, f 4A), cA = (c1A, c2A, c3A, c4A),
fB = ( f 1B, f 2B, f 3B, f 4B), cB = (c1B, c2B, c3B, c4B).
Then the fuzzy profit functions of companies A and B, represented by FTpiA and FTpiB , can be calculated by Eqs.
(6) and (7), respectively.
FTpiA = T RAΘFTCA
= p(Q)qAΘFTCA
= (αqA + βq2A + βqAqB)Θ( f 1A + c1AqA, f 2A + c2AqA, f 3A + c3AqA, f 4A + c4AqA)
= ((α − c4A)qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 4A, (α − c3A)qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 3A,
(α − c2A)qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 2A, (α − c1A)qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 1A) (6)
and
FTpiA = P(Q)qBΘFTCB
= (α + β (qA + qB)) qBΘ( f 1B + c1BqB, f 2B + c2BqB, f 3B + c3BqB, f 4B + c4BqB)
= ((α − c4B)qB + βqAqB + βq2B − f 4B, (α − c3B)qB + βqAqB + βq2B − f 3B,
(α − c2B)qB + βqAqB + βq2B − f 2B, (α − c1B)qB + βqAqB + βq2B − f 1B). (7)
By Eq. (2), the graded mean integration representation P (FTpiA) of FTpiA is
P (FTpiA) =
[(
α − c4A
)
qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 4A
]+ 2 [(α − c3A) qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 3A]
6
+ 2
[(
α − c2A
)
qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 2A
]+ [(α − c1A) qA + βqAqB + βq2A − f 1A]
6
=
[
α − c
1
A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A
6
]
qA + βqAqB + βq2A −
f 1A + 2 f 2A + 2 f 3A + f 4A
6
.
Similarly, the graded mean integration representation of FTpiB is
P (FTpiB) =
[
α − c
1
B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
6
]
qB + βqAqB + βq2B −
f 1B + 2 f 2B + 2 f 3B + f 4B
6
.
Pattern 1: Both companies A and B are followers.
Step 1: Find the response functions of companies A and B.
By considering the maximum profit of company A, we can calculate the first-order partial of P (FTpiA) versus qA
and suppose the derivative result equals zero. Then the response function of company A can be found. That is, let
∂P (FTpiA)
∂qA
= α + 2βqA + βqB − c
1
A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A
6
= 0. (8)
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Then, by Eq. (8), we can find the response function of Company A.
qA = c
1
A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A − 6α − 6βqB
12β
. (9)
Similarly, we can find the response function of company B.
qB = c
1
B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B − 6α − 6βqA
12β
. (10)
Step 2: By Eqs. (9) and (10), the optimum output quantities of companies A and B, represented by qFA1 and qFB1 , can
be found. That is
qFA1 =
2c1A + 4c2A + 4c3A + 2c4A − c1B − 2c2B − 2c3B − c4B − 6α
18β
(11)
qFB1 =
2c1B + 4c2B + 4c3B + 2c4B − c1A − 2c2A − 2c3A − c4A − 6α
18β
. (12)
Step 3: By taking Eqs. (11) and (12) into Eq. (3), we can find the market equilibrium price. That is,
P1 = c
1
A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B + 6α
18β
. (13)
Step 4: By taking qFA1 and qFB1 into Eqs. (6) and (7), the fuzzy maximum profits FTpiFA1 and FTpiFB1 of companies
A and B can be found.
FTpiFA1 = ((α − c4A)qFA1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FA1 − f 4A, (α − c3A)qFA1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FA1 − f 3A,
(α − c2A)qFA1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FA1 − f 2A, (α − c1A)qFA1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FA1 − f 1A) (14)
FTpiFB1 = ((α − c4B)qFB1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FB1 − f 4B, (α − c3B)qFB1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FB1 − f 3B,
(α − c2B)qFB1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FB1 − f 2B, (α − c1B)qFB1 + βqFA1qFB1 + βq2FB1 − f 1B). (15)
Step 5: By Eqs. (14) and (15), the fuzzy total profit FTpi1 in pattern 1 is as below.
FTpi1 = FTpiFA1 ⊕ FTpiFB1 . (16)
Pattern 2: Company A is a leader and company B is a follower.
Step 1: By taking the response function of company B, represented by Eq. (10), into Eq. (6), the fuzzy profits function
FTpiA is as below:
FTpiA =
((
6α − 12c4A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qA + β2 q
2
A − f 4A,(
6α − 12c3A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qA + β2 q
2
A − f 3A,(
6α − 12c2A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qA + β2 q
2
A − f 2A,(
6α − 12c1A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qA + β2 q
2
A − f 1A
)
. (17)
Then the graded mean integration representation P (FTpiA) of FTpiA is
P (FTpiA) =
(
6α + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B − 2c1A − 4c2A − 4c3A − 2c4A
)
qA
12
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+ 6βq
2
A − 2 f 1A − 4 f 2A − 4 f 3A − 2 f 4A
12
.
Step 2: Let qL A2 be the optimum quantity of company A. It can be found by taking first-order partial of P (FTpiA)
versus qA and assuming the derivative result equals zero. That is, let
∂P (FTpiA)
∂qA
=
(
6α + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B − 2c1A − 4c2A − 4c3A − 2c4A
)+ 12βqA
12
= 0. (18)
By solving the equation above, we can find qL A2 as below:
qL A2 =
2c1A + 4c2A + 4c3A + 2c4A − c1B − 2c2B − 2c3B − c4B − 6α
12β
. (19)
Step 3: By taking Eq. (19) into Eq. (17), we can find the fuzzy maximum profit FTpiL A2 of company A.
FTpiL A2 =
((
6α − 12c4A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qL A2 +
β
2
q2L A2 − f 4A,(
6α − 12c3A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qL A2 +
β
2
q2L A2 − f 3A,(
6α − 12c2A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qL A2 +
β
2
q2L A2 − f 2A,(
6α − 12c1A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
)
qL A2 +
β
2
q2L A2 − f 1A
)
. (20)
Step 4: By taking Eq. (19) into Eq. (10), we can find the optimum output quantity qFB2 of company B.
qFB2 =
3c1B + 6c2B + 6c3B + 3c4B − 2c1A − 4c2A − 4c3A − c4A − 6α
24β
. (21)
Step 5: By taking Eqs. (19) and (21) into Eq. (3), the market equilibrium price P2 in pattern 2 can be found.
P2 = 2c
1
A + 4c2A + 4c3A + 2c4A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B + 6α
24
. (22)
Step 6: By taking qL A2 and qFB2 into Eq. (7), the fuzzy maximum profit FTpiLB2 of company B in pattern 2 is as
below:
FTpiFB2 = ((α − c4B)qFB2 + βqL A2qFB2 + βq2FB2 − f 4B, (α − c3B)qFB2 + βqL A2qFB2 + βq2FB2 − f 3B,
(α − c2B)qFB2 + βqL A2qFB2 + βq2FB2 − f 2B, (α − c1B)qFB2 + βqL A2qFB2 + βq2FB2 − f 1B). (23)
Step 7: Then the fuzzy total profit FTpi2 in pattern 2 is
FTpi2 = FTpiL A2 ⊕ FTpiFB2 . (24)
Pattern 3: Company B is a leader and company A is a follower.
By copying the analysis of pattern 2, the following results can be found:
The optimum output quantity qLB3 of company B is
qLB3 =
2c1B + 4c2B + 4c3B + 2c4B − c1A − 2c2A − 2c3A − c4A − 6α
12β
. (25)
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The fuzzy maximum profit FTpiLB3 of company B is
FTpiLB3 =
((
6α − 12c4B + c1A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A
12
)
qLB3 +
β
2
q2LB3 − f 4B,(
6α − 12c3B + c1A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A
12
)
qLB3 +
β
2
q2LB3 − f 3B,(
6α − 12c2B + c1A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A
12
)
qLB3 +
β
2
q2LB3 − f 2B,(
6α − 12c1B + c1A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A
12
)
qLB3 +
β
2
q2LB3 − f 1B
)
. (26)
Step 1: By taking Eq. (25) into Eq. (9), we can find the optimum output quantity qFA3 of company A, it can be
expressed as
qFA3 =
3c1A + 6c2A + 6c3A + 3c4A − 2c1B − 4c2B − 4c3B − 2c4B − 6α
24β
. (27)
Step 2: By taking Eqs. (25) and (27) into Eq. (3), we can find the market equilibrium price P3 in pattern 3, that is
P3 = 2c
1
B + 4c2B + 4c3B + 2c4B + c1A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A + 6α
24
.
Step 3: By taking qLB3 and qFA3 into Eq. (6), the fuzzy maximum profit FTpiFA3 is
FTpiFA3 = ((α − c4A) · qFA3 + βqFA3qLB3 + βq2FA3 − f 4A, (α − c3A) · qFA3 + βqFA3qLB3 + βq2FA3 − f 3A,
(α − c2A) · qFA3 + βqFA3qLB3 + βq2FA3 − f 2A, (α − c1A) · qFA3 + βqFA3qLB3 + βq2FA3 − f 1A). (28)
Step 4: Then the fuzzy total profit FTpi3 of companies A and B is
FTpi3 = FTpiFA3 ⊕ FTpiLB3 . (29)
Pattern 4: Both companies A and B are leaders.
Step 1: When company A is a leader and company B is a follower, the optimum output quantities of companies A and
B are as below, respectively.
qL A2 =
2c1A + 4c2A + 4c3A + 2c4A − c1B − 2c2B − 2c3B − c4B − 6α
12β
qFB2 =
3c1B + 6c2B + 6c3B + 3c4B − 2c1A − 4c2A − 4c3A − c4A − 6α
24β
.
And the fuzzy maximum profits FTpiL A2 and FTpiFB2 are expressed as Eqs. (20) and (23).
Step 2: When company B is a leader and company A is a follower, the optimum output quantities of the two companies
are as below:
qLB3 =
2c1B + 4c2B + 4c3B + 2c4B − c1A − 2c2A − 2c3A − c4A − 6α
12β
qFA3 =
3c1A + 6c2A + 6c3A + 3c4A − 2c1B − 4c2B − 4c3B − 2c4B − 6α
24β
.
And the fuzzy maximum profits FTpiL A2 and FTpiFB2 are expressed as Eqs. (26) and (28).
Step 3: When both companies A and B are leaders, the optimum output quantities of the two companies are as below:
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Table 1
The optimum output quantities, fuzzy maximum profits, fuzzy total profits and equilibrium market prices of the four different market structures
Company B
Leader Follower
Company A Leader FTpiL A4 qL A4 FTpiL A2 qL A2
FTpiLB4 qLB4 FTpiFB2 qLB2
FTpi4 P4 FTpi2 P2
Follower FTpiFA3 qL A3 FTpiFA1 qFA1
FTpiLB3 qLB3 FTpiFB1 qFB1
FTpi3 P3 FTpi1 P1
The optimum output quantity of company A is
qL A4 = qL A2 =
2c1A + 4c2A + 4c3A + 2c4A − c1B − 2c2B − 2c3B − c4B − 6α
12β
. (30)
The optimum output quantity of company B is
qLB4 = qLB3 =
2c1B + 4c2B + 4c3B + 2c4B − c1A − 2c2A − 2c3A − c4A − 6α
12β
. (31)
By taking qL A4 and qLB4 into Eqs. (6) and (7), the fuzzy maximum profits and fuzzy total profit, FTpiL A4 , FTpiLB4
and FTpi4, are as below:
FTpiL A4 = ((α − c4A)qL A4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2L A4 − f 4A, (α − c3A)qL A4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2L A4 − f 3A,
(α − c2A)qL A4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2L A4 − f 2A, (α − c1A)qL A4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2L A4 − f 1A)
FTpiLB4 = ((α − c4B)qLB4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2LB4 − f 4B, (α − c3B)qLB4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2LB4 − f 3B,
(α − c2B)qLB4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2LB4 − f 2B, (α − c1B)qLB4 + βqL A4qLB4 + βq2LB4 − f 1B) (32)
FTpi4 = FTpiL A4 ⊕ FTpiLB4 .
And by taking Eqs. (30) and (31) into Eq. (3), we can find the market equilibrium price P4 in pattern 4, that is,
P4 = c
1
A + 2c2A + 2c3A + c4A + c1B + 2c2B + 2c3B + c4B
12
.
By understanding the analysis of four cases described above, we can obtain the optimum output quantities, fuzzy
maximum profits, fuzzy total profits and market equilibrium prices of the four different market structures. These
results are shown as Table 1.
4. Numerical example
In this section, a hypothetical optimum output quantity decision problem of duopoly market is designed to explain
the computational process of the fuzzy Stackelberg model proposed here.
Assume that companies A and B need to make decision of the optimum output quantities in a duopoly market. The
estimated fuzzy fixed costs, fuzzy variable costs are given as follows:
For company A, the fuzzy fixed cost is about 65,000 dollars, and the fuzzy variable cost a unit is about 200 dollars.
That is, fA = (60000, 65000, 65000, 68000) and cA = (150, 200, 200, 230).
For company B, the fuzzy fixed cost is about 60,000 dollars, and the fuzzy variable cost a unit is about 250 dollars.
That is, fB = (55000, 60000, 60000, 63000), and cA = (200, 250, 250, 280).
Then, the fuzzy total costs of companies A and B are
FTCA = (60000+ 150qA, 65000+ 200qA, 65000+ 200qA, 68000+ 230qA)
FTCB = (55000+ 200qB, 60000+ 250qB, 60000+ 250qB, 63000+ 280qB).
In addition, let demand price P be P = 2100− 2 (qA + qB).
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Pattern 1: Both companies A and B are followers.
In this pattern, the optimum output quantities, fuzzy maximum profits, fuzzy total profit and market equilibrium
price of the two companies are as below:
qFA1 = 304, qFB1 = 308, P1 = 848
FTpiFA1 = (128188, 140313,140313, 160521);
FTpiFB1 = (120458,132708, 132708, 153125);
FTpi1 = (248646, 273021, 273021, 313646).
Pattern 2: Company A is a leader and company B is a follower.
In this pattern, the optimum output quantities, fuzzy maximum profits, fuzzy total profit and market equilibrium
price of the two companies are as below:
qL A2 = 488, qFB2 = 219, P2 = 685
FTpiL A2 = (154192,171842,171842,201258);
FTpiFB2 = (25763,35338,35338,51296);
FTpi2 = (179954,207179,207179,252554).
Pattern 3: Company B is a leader and company A is a follower.
In this pattern, the optimum output quantities, fuzzy maximum profits, fuzzy total profit and market equilibrium
price of the two companies are as below:
qLB3 = 451, qFA3 = 250, P3 = 698
FTpiLB3 = (125223, 141748, 141748, 169290);
FTpiFA3 = (49070, 59582, 59582, 77103);
FTpi3 = (174293, 201330, 201330, 246393).
Pattern 4: Both companies A and B are leaders.
When both companies A and B are leaders, they decide the optimum output quantity is based on profit itself.
1. Company A is a leader and company B is a follower:
qL A2 = 488, qFB2 = 219
FTpiL A2 = (154192, 171842, 171842, 201258);
FTpiFB2 = (25763, 35338, 35338, 51296);
FTpi2 = (179954, 207179, 207179, 252554).
2. Company B is a leader and company A is a follower:
qLB3 = 451, qFA3 = 250
FTpiLB3 = (125223, 141748, 141748, 169290) ;
FTpiFA3 = (49070, 59582, 59582, 77103);
FTpi = (174293, 201330, 201330, 246393).
3. When both companies A and B are leaders, they want their fuzzy profit to be maximal.
To pursue the maximum individual fuzzy profit, they want to be leaders.
The company A will produce the output quantity qL A4 = 488.
And company B will produce the output quantity qLB4 = 451.
FTpiL A4 = (−71904,−54264,−54264,−24864);
FTpiLB4 = (−91304,−73664,−73664,−44264);
FTpi4 = (−163208,−127928,−127928,−69128);
P4 = 222.
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Table 2
The optimum output quantities, fuzzy maximum profits, fuzzy total profits and equilibrium market prices of four different market structures
Company B
Leader Follower
Company A Leader FTpiL A4 = (−71904,−54264,−54264,−24864) FTpiL A2 = (154192, 171842, 171842, 201258)
FTpiLB4 = (−91304,−73664,−73664,−44264) FTpiFB2 = (25763, 35338, 35338, 51296)
FTpi4 = (−163208,−127928,−127928,−69128) FTpi2 = (179954, 207179, 207179, 252554)
qL A4 = 488; qLB4 = 451; P4 = 222 qL A2 = 488; qFB2 = 219; P2 = 685
Follower FTpiLB3 = (125223, 141748, 141748, 169290) FTpiFA1 = (128188, 140313, 140313, 160521)
FTpiFA3 = (49070, 59582, 59582, 77103) FTpiFB1 = (120458, 132708, 132708, 153125)
FTpi3 = (174293, 201330, 201330, 246393) FTpi1 = (248646, 273021, 273021, 313646)
qLB3 = 451; qFA3 = 250; P3 = 698 qFA1 = 304; qFB1 = 308; P1 = 848
By understanding the analysis results of four cases described above, we can find the optimum output quantities,
fuzzy maximum profits, fuzzy total profits and market equilibrium prices of four different market structures. They are
expressed as Table 2.
For company A, the fuzzy profits of four different market structures are as below:
FTpiFA1 = (128188, 140131, 140131, 160521);
FTpiL A2 = (154192, 171842, 171842, 201258);
FTpiFA3 = (49070, 59582, 59582, 77103);
FTpiL A4 = (−71094,−54264,−54264,−24864).
Based on the graded mean integration representation method,
P
(
FTpiFA1
) = 128,188+ 2× 140,313+ 2× 140,313+ 160, 521
6
= 141,660
P
(
FTpiL A2
) = 154,192+ 2× 171,842+ 2× 171,842+ 210, 258
6
= 173,803
P
(
FTpiFA3
) = 49,070+ 2× 59,582+ 2× 59,582+ 77, 103
6
= 60,750
P
(
FTpiL A4
) = (−71,904)+ 2× (−54,264)+ 2× (−54,264)+ (−24,864)
6
= −52,304.
Since P
(
FTpiL A2
)
> P
(
FTpiFA1
)
> P
(
FTpiFA3
)
> P
(
FTpiL A4
)
,
So FTpiL A2 > FTpiFA1 > FTpiFA3 > FTpiL A4 .
For company B, the fuzzy profits of four different market structures are as below:
FTpiFB1 = (120458, 132708, 132708, 153125);
FTpiFB2 = (25763, 35338, 35338, 51296);
FTpiLB3 = (125223, 141748, 141748, 169290);
FTpiLB4 = (−91304,−73664,−73664,−44264).
Based on the graded mean integration representation method,
P
(
FTpiFB1
) = 120,458+ 2× 132,708+ 2× 132,708+ 153, 125
6
= 134,069
P
(
FTpiFB2
) = 25,763+ 2× 35,338+ 2× 35,338+ 51, 296
6
= 36,402
P
(
FTpiLB3
) = 125,223+ 2× 141,748+ 2× 141,748+ 169, 290
6
= 143,584
P
(
FTpiLB4
) = (−91,304)+ 2× (−73,664)+ 2× (−73,664)+ (−44,264)
6
= −71,704.
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Since P(FTpiLB3) > P(FTpiFB1) > P(FTpiFB2) > P(FTpiLB4),
So FTpiLB3 > FTpiFB1 > FTpiFB2 > FTpiLB4 .
The fuzzy total profits of companies A and B are as below:
FTpi1 = (248646, 273021, 273021, 313646);
FTpi2 = (179954, 207179, 207179, 252554);
FTpi3 = (174293, 201330, 201330, 246393);
FTpi4 = (−163208,−127928,−127928,−69128).
Based on the graded mean integration representation method,
P (FTpi1) = 248,646+ 2× 273,021+ 2× 273,021+ 313, 6466 = 275,729
P (FTpi2) = 179,954+ 2× 207,179+ 2× 207,179+ 252, 5546 = 210,204
P (FTpi3) = 174,293+ 2× 201,330+ 2× 201,330+ 246, 3936 = 204,334
P (FTpi4) = (−163,208)+ 2× (−127,928)+ 2× (−127,928)+ (−69,128)6 = −124,008.
Since P(FTpi1) > P(FTpi2) > P(FTpi3) > P(FTpi4).
So FTpi1 > FTpi2 > FTpi3 > FTpi4.
Based on the analysis results stated above, we find:
1. When both companies A and B are followers. The equilibrium market price and the total fuzzy profit are maximal.
That is,
848 > 698 > 685 > 222
FTpi1 > FTpi2 > FTpi3 > FTpi4.
And, the company individual fuzzy profit is almost maximal.
Since, for company A: FTpiL A2 > FTpiFA1 > FTpiFA3 > FTpiL A4 .
And for company B: FTpiLB3 > FTpiLB1 > FTpiFB2 > FTpiLB4 .
2. When both companies A and B are leaders and both companies produce many products, the equilibrium market
price and total fuzzy profit are minimal. That is,
222 < 685 < 698 < 848
FTpi1 < FTpi2 < FTpi3 < FTpi4.
And, the company individual fuzzy profit will be the lowest.
Since, for company A: FTpiL A4 > FTpiFA3 > FTpiFA1 > FTpiL A2 .
And, for company B: FTpiLB4 > FTpiLB2 > FTpiFB1 > FTpiLB3 .
Therefore, the best decision is ‘both companies A and B are followers’.
5. Conclusions
In business decision analysis, obviously, the difficulty in finding precise assessment data such as fixed cost,
unit variable cost of product caused the vagueness and uncertainty of the relevant information in deciding. So, the
conventional precision-based decision analysis method is less effective in suggesting available information in such an
imprecise and fuzzy decision environment.
This paper improves the estimating methods in which we can send the estimation of decision variables by the
linguistic values characterized by trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. Further, in this paper we examined an analytical method
of effectively carrying out the “optimum output quantity” decision of duopoly market under a fuzzy environment. The
proposed fuzzy model of duopoly not only considered the factors of market demand, business cost and market position
but also could be used to analyze the interaction tactic behavior between enterprises. Besides, the proposed model can
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be computerized to enable the decision-makers to achieve the best decision automatically either by conducting fuzzy
or non-fuzzy assessment.
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